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ABSTRACT
This study revisits the effectiveness of the audit committee independence and 
expertise in preventing earnings management practices.  Studies in other studies 
with relatively stricter regulations showed the audit committee independence was 
effective to prevent earnings management.  On the contrary, studies in Indonesia 
were arguably outdated and shorter in period.  This study was conducted on 
Indonesian listed-manufacturing companies from 2009 to 2015. It used two earnings 
management model such as Modifi ed Jones Model and Performance-Adjusted 
Modifi ed Jones Model. The results showed that audit committee independence is 
effective to prevent earnings management practices.  However, it was found that 
audit committee expertise did not affect earnings management practices.  The 
results are consistent for both earnings management models. Although majority 
of the audit members in Indonesian listed manufacturing companies are experts 
in accounting and fi nance, the existence of those expert members did not affect the 
companies to engage or not engage in earnings management practices.  However, 
the accounting and/or fi nancial expertise does not determine the effectiveness of the 
audit committee’s monitoring role.
ABSTRAK
Studi ini meninjau kembali efektivitas independensi dan keahlian dari komite 
audit dalam mencegah praktik manajemen laba. Studi sejenis yang dilakukan 
di negara lain yang memiliki peraturan yang relatif lebih ketat, menunjukkan 
bahwa independensi dari komite audit efektif dalam mencegah praktik manajemen 
laba. Dilain pihak, studi yang dilaksanakan di Indonesia dapat dikatakan sudah 
cukup lama dan menggunakan periode yang relatif pendek. keahlian komite 
audit masih jarang dilakukan di Indonesia. Adapun studi ini dilakukan pada 
perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia pada periode 2009 
sampai dengan 2015. Studi ini menggunakan dua model manajemen laba yaitu 
Modifi ed Jones Model dan Performance-Adjusted Modifi ed Jones Model. Hasilnya 
menunjukkan bahwa independensi dari komite audit efektif dalam mencegah 
praktik manajemen laba.  Meskipun demikian, ditemukan bahwa keahlian yang 
dimiliki oleh anggota komite audit tidak berpengaruh pada praktik manajemen laba. 
Mayoritas dari anggota komite audit perusahaan-perusahaan manufaktur yang 
terdaftar di bursa memiliki keahlian di bidang akuntansi dan keuangan. Namun, 
keberadaan mereka tidak mempengaruhi perusahaan untuk terlibat atau tidak 
terlibat dalam praktik manajemen laba.  Dengan demikian, keahlian fi nansial dan 
akuntansi bukanlah merupakan faktor penenentu efektivitas komite audit dalam 
menjalankan peran pengawasannya.
1.  INTRODUCTION
In the early 2018, Faisal Basri, an Indonesian 
economist, allegedly stated that business 
performance of the manufacturing industry 
in Indonesia was declining,  which as he 
stated,  it has happened since 2011 (Kumparan, 
2018).  Besides it is caused by the reduction 
in purchasing power, imported products 
seemingly continue to overfl ow the domestic 
market, causing domestic products to be 
marginalized, which then reduced the 
production. This phenomenon has undesirably 
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affected Indonesia’s gross domestic product. 
Indeed, given the slowdown in production, 
fi rms’ profi tability may also be reduced and 
instigate negative consequences on fi rms’ 
overall performance.  To the extent that fi rms 
desire to meet certain targets and to be able 
to maintain their competitive advantage, they 
may engage in earnings management practices 
(Kapoor & Goel, 2017; Young, 2018).   
In order to alleviate the negative 
consequences of earnings management 
practices, monitoring costs such as 
management audit should be commonly 
applied.  The notion of GCG arguably creates 
the expectancy for the company to provide 
more transparent corporate practices.  The 
GCG code usually outlines several mechanisms 
that could improve stakeholders’ confi dence 
towards publicly listed companies.  One of 
those mechanisms is the presence of an audit 
committee in every listed company.  This 
is because audit committee is considered 
as helping the board of commissioners in 
performing their monitoring roles, specifi cally 
in the area of corporate fi nancial reporting. 
Indeed, the existence of audit committee as 
required in good corporate governance (GCG) 
is expected to provide unbiased monitoring 
device to the corporation, although the 
possibility to engage in earnings manipulation 
may still exists because managers could 
have the incentives to expropriate corporate 
resources due to many motives.
More transparent corporate fi nancial 
practices may lead the company to provide 
more reliable fi nancial information, especially 
to the shareholders.  The shareholders are to be 
ensured that management is being accountable 
to them, and acting according to their best 
interest.  Therefore, the presence of an audit 
committee is in line with the needs for the 
company to be accountable to its shareholders. 
This is because the committee might prevent 
the company to engage in unfavorable fi nancial 
practices such as earnings management that 
can result in providing unreliable fi nancial 
information to the shareholders.
The existing studies related to the relation 
between audit committee independence and 
earnings management in different countries 
show that the independence of the audit 
committee is essential to prevent earnings 
management practices (e.g., Alkdai & 
Hanefah, 2012; Bedard, Chtourou, & Courteau, 
2004; Inaam & Khamoussi, 2016; Miko & 
Kamardin, 2015; Nik Salleh & Che Haat, 
2014; Peasnell, Pope, & Young, 2005; Saleh, 
Iskandar, & Rahmat, 2007).  However, it can 
be argued that the code of GCG in Indonesia 
regarding the audit committee is relatively 
more lenient because, unlike the regulation 
in other countries (e.g., Australian Stock 
Exchange, 2003), the regulations in Indonesia 
only specifi ed that at least one member is 
an independent commissioner (National 
Committee on Governance, 2006; Otoritas Jasa 
Keuangan, 2015).  Hence, the degree of the 
audit committee independence in Indonesia 
may affect the effectiveness of its monitoring 
role, specifi cally in preventing earnings 
management practices.
Another specifi cation regarding an 
audit committee as required by Indonesia’s 
code of GCG and Otoritas Jasa Keuangan 
(OJK) is that the audit committee should at 
least has one member with accounting and 
fi nance background (National Committee on 
Governance, 2006; Otoritas Jasa Keuangan, 
2015).  This is due to the extensive knowledge 
possessed by the committee members 
regarding the accounting and fi nance area that 
enable them to scrutinize corporate fi nancial 
reports and other related matters.  Therefore, 
the audit committee’s expertise is also essential 
to prevent earnings management practices. 
However, studies have shown mixed results 
regarding whether the expertise of audit 
committee members is effective to reduce 
earnings management practices. Badolato, 
Donelson, and Ege (2014), for example, found 
that fi rms with audit committee expertise was 
able to reduce earnings management practices. 
In contrast, Alkdai and Hanefah (2012) 
found that audit committee expertise has no 
signifi cant infl uence on earnings management. 
In Indonesia, several studies have been 
conducted to examine the effect of audit 
committee on earnings management practices. 
For instance, Pamudji and Trihartati (2010) 
found that independence of audit committee 
signifi cantly infl uenced earnings management 
practices in 56 Indonesian manufacturing 
companies.  Although it only utilized a small 
sample size, that particular study can be 
considered as one of the early studies on the 
relation of audit committee and earnings 
management conducted in Indonesia, 
specifi cally related to the enactment of audit 
committee regulation.  This is because before its 
role is taken over by OJK which is the Indonesia 
Financial Services Authority, BAPEPAM-LK 
(i.e., the Capital Market Supervisory Agency 
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and Financial Institution) as the previous 
regulator of the capital market required every 
listed company to establish an audit committee. 
In fact, as stated on the Decree of the Chairman 
of BAPEPAM number KEP-41/PM/2003, every 
Indonesian public company is regulated to 
have an audit committee by December 31, 2004. 
However, the regulation may provide different 
implications to current practices.  Another 
study by Restuningdiah (2011) conducted on 
35 public companies in Indonesia on 2009 did 
not found any infl uence of audit committee 
on earnings management.  This latter study, 
however, measured the effectiveness of audit 
committee using number of meetings, as well, 
it utilized income smoothing as the earnings 
management measurement. 
This study revisited the relation of 
corporate governance mechanism to earnings 
quality. It extends the previous studies by 
investigating whether the characteristics of 
the audit committee as one of the corporate 
governance mechanisms is effective to prevent 
earnings management practices among manu-
facturing companies listed in Indonesia 
Stock Exchange (IDX). Incorporating more 
current and longer period of study, this study 
examined whether over time the compliance 
to the regulations ensures the effectiveness of 
the monitoring role of the audit committee.  In 
addition, it analyzed the impact of the audit 
committee independence and expertise on 
corporate earnings management practices 
using two earnings management models, the 
Modifi ed Jones Model and the Performance-
Matched Modifi ed Jones Model, to ensure 
the robustness of the results.  In addition, this 
study contributes to the existing literature by 
providing new evidence on the effectiveness of 
audit committee which is one of the corporate 
governance mechanisms in alleviating earnings 
management practices.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND 
HYPOTHESIS
Earnings Management 
Earnings management is a prevalent corporate 
activity that has been studied across time.  It 
refers to the action taken by the management 
to attain the targeted level of earnings which 
can be done through particular choices of 
accounting principles and/or implementation 
of particular operating decisions (McKee, 
2005).  Regarding the accounting choices by 
the management, the continuum of earnings 
management varies from conservative 
accounting to fraudulent accounting.  At the 
end of this continuum, fraudulent accounting 
is a choice of accounting principles that violate 
the generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP) (Dechow & Skinner, 2000; McKee, 
2005). Indeed, Healy and Wahlen (1999) 
regarded earnings management as a judgment 
by the management that is deliberately 
intended to manipulate fi nancial reports.  This 
manipulation will then mislead and infl uence 
the decision-makers in taking certain actions 
that can be harmful to them.  Therefore, on 
the one hand, earnings management can be 
conducted legally whenever the accounting 
choices are in accordance with GAAP; on 
the other hand, earnings management may 
be illegal when conducted overly aggressive 
through the violations of GAAP.
There are some incentives why the 
management deliberately chooses to manage 
earnings.  Besides to avoid reporting losses, 
Dechow and Skinner (2000) described, for 
example, an incentive for the management 
to manage earnings is because analyst and 
money managers may provide incentives to 
management whenever they can meet earnings 
forecasts.  In this case, higher earnings may 
result in higher stock prices.  Better earnings 
performance may increase the market value 
of a company, attract more investors, and 
boost the managers’ reputation. Consequently, 
earnings management becomes an inseparable 
practice among corporations.
There are two parties within a company 
(i.e., management and shareholders) that can 
typically have different interests that need to 
be aligned through an effective mechanism. 
The contradicting interests can be caused by 
the information asymmetry between those two 
parties (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  To a larger 
extent, information asymmetry may drive the 
management to take maximum advantage 
on the expense of shareholders by practicing 
earnings management.  Although to some 
extent it may be a good way of communicating 
the inside information from the management 
to investors, earnings management can be 
harmful particularly when the management 
opportunistically use earnings management 
to benefi t themselves (Scott, 2015).  To avoid 
the misbehavior, a controlling and monitoring 
mechanism is important to be employed inside 
a company.  Therefore, studies have been 
conducted to examine whether particular 
mechanisms are effective to prevent earnings 
management practices (e.g., Davidson, 
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Goodwin-Stewart, & Kent, 2005; Klein, 2002).
One mechanism to align management 
and shareholders’ interests is through a GCG 
practice.  The fall of several big corporations 
around 2000 to 2002 (e.g., Enron, WorldCom) 
caused market confi dence to diminish.  The 
enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOA) 
by the U.S. Congress indicates that government 
and regulators were concerned about the 
loss of public confi dence over corporation’s 
fi nancial practices.  SOA provides more 
rigorous requirements regarding corporate 
governance organs within public companies, 
mainly to increase corporate transparency 
and accountability and to promote a more 
truthful and fairness representation of fi nancial 
reporting (Oxley & Sarbanes, 2002).  Since then 
the practice of GCG was more prevailing, hence 
stricter corporate governance practices will be 
expected these days based on several reasons 
such as to comply with the regulation, to avoid 
unlawful acts that can destroy its reputation, 
and to be favorably valued by the market.
Although there are various ways to 
investigate earnings management, studies 
related to it are usually conducted by assessing 
accruals. There are two types of accruals 
which are discretionary and nondiscretionary. 
Discretionary accruals are accruals that are 
managed through accounting choices by 
management and usually used by the managers 
for income smoothing (Spohr, 2005).  In contrast, 
nondiscretionary accruals are considered as 
accruals that are mandatory and might not 
depend on the management discretion to be 
incurred.  Given that discretionary accruals are 
those that can vary according to the accounting 
choices and treatments by the management 
and might be easily manipulated, this type of 
accruals is usually used as a proxy for earnings 
management.
Audit Committee
Indonesia’s code of GCG, in particular, requires 
an independent commissioner to be the chair 
of an audit committee, as well as one of its 
members to possess accounting and/or fi nance 
background.  Besides, before 2012, BAPEPAM-
LK only requires every publicly listed 
company to have an audit committee with 
the characteristics in accordance to what had 
been prescribed by the National Committee on 
Governance (NCG).  Given the characteristics 
has been early prescribed, the audit committee 
independence and expertise then became the 
focus of this paper.
Audit Committee Independence
Independence of the members is essential for 
the audit committee to be impartially exercise 
its judgment regarding the fi nancial reporting 
of a company. It could also be an attribute to 
mitigate contracting costs (Deli & Gillan, 2000). 
Bedard et al. (2004) concluded that aggressive 
propensity of earnings manipulation is 
able to be reduced in companies whose 
audit committee members are completely 
independent.  In fact, it is asserted that when 
the board of directors is less independent and 
there is no audit committee,  companies have 
a tendency to engage in fi nancial reporting 
fraud (Beasley, 1996).  Therefore, a more 
independent audit committee is expected to 
prevent earnings manipulations.
According to the Decree of the Chairman 
of BAPEPAM number KEP-29/PM/2004 which 
was later amended by the OJK Regulation No. 
55/PJOK.04/2015, the minimum number of 
audit committee members is three and one of 
them should be the independent commissioner 
of the company who also serves as the 
chairman of the committee.  Several criteria 
related to an independent member are such as 
he or she; (1) should not have a family relation 
with directors, commissioners and the major 
shareholders of the company, (2) should not 
possess a direct and indirect business relation 
with the company, (3) should not be a direct or 
indirect shareholder of the company or other 
public companies, and (4) should not be a 
person who is in charge to direct and control 
the activities of the company at least six months 
before the appointment.  These criteria are 
considerably essential to isolate the member 
from being controlled by certain parties.
A study by Bedard et al. (2004) examined 
the possibility to engage in earnings 
manipulation among the companies whose 
audit committee members were 100 percent 
independent compared to those whose 
audit committee members were majority 
independent.  They found that companies 
which have 100 percent independent audit 
committee members were less probable to 
conduct aggressive earnings manipulation. 
Peasnell et al. (2005), in their study, found that 
the upward management of earnings occurred 
less in companies that had larger numbers of 
independent directors.  Moreover, a study 
conducted in Malaysia by Saleh et al. (2007) 
found that a company would have fewer 
tendencies for earnings manipulation if all of its 
audit committee members were independent. 
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Although Alkdai and Hanefah (2012) in 
another Malaysian study showed that audit 
committee members in the sample observations 
were not fully independent (i.e., only around 
82 percent), it is found that the independence 
of audit committee is effective to reduce 
earnings management.  Sharma and Kuang 
(2014) examined the relationship between 
audit committee voluntary characteristics and 
earnings management.  Using New Zealand 
listed fi rms in 2004 to 2005 they found that 
audit committee that has majority independent 
directors is able to reduce aggressive earnings 
management.  Nevertheless, they did not 
found any impact of 100 percent independent 
audit committee on earnings management, 
thus suggesting that 100 percent audit 
committee independence may not necessary to 
be imposed.  Those studies provide insight that 
the more independent the audit committee, 
the more effective its monitoring role would 
be performed.  On the other hand, García, 
Barbadillo, and Pérez (2012) in the study of 108 
Spanish publicly traded companies found no 
signifi cant relation between audit committee 
independence and earnings management. 
However, their study only utilized a dummy 
variable to proxy for audit committee 
independence which arguably might not 
fully capture the relative independence 
capacity of the audit committee.  Accordingly, 
the argument that the independence of 
audit committee members could refl ect the 
effectiveness of their monitoring role leads to 
the hypothesis below:
H1: Audit committee independence affects earnings 
management practices in Indonesian listed 
manufacturing companies.
Audit Committee Expertise
Studies show that, particularly, an audit 
committee which has members with accounting 
and/or fi nance knowledge is more effective in 
performing its monitoring role (e.g., McDaniel, 
Martin, & Maines, 2002).  Other than Indonesia, 
the expertise characteristic is also required by 
regulations in other countries which suggest 
that at least one audit committee member 
should be a fi nancial expert (American Bar 
Association, 1999; Australian Stock Exchange, 
2003; National Committee on Governance, 
2006; Oxley & Sarbanes, 2002).  In addition, 
McMullen and Raghunandan (1996) stated 
that it would be more preferable if the fi nancial 
expert member is affi liated with accounting 
professional body, an experienced public 
accountant, an auditor, or a fi nancial offi cer. 
On the contrary, the regulation in Indonesia 
does not permit an audit committee member 
to be affi liated with professional bodies (e.g., 
public accountant, auditor, etc.) that provided 
services to the company within six months 
before his/her admission to the committee. 
Nevertheless, the knowledge and expertise 
can supposedly enhance the effectiveness of 
the audit committee members to oversee and 
protect the integrity of companies’ fi nancial 
reporting.
McDaniel et al. (2002) stated that the 
expertise of the members of an audit committee 
enables them to assure the quality of the 
companies’ fi nancial reporting.  A survey was 
conducted by McMullen and Raghunandan 
(1996) to several corporations with a different 
fi nancial condition.  They found that among the 
51 companies that were in fi nancial problems 
only six percent of them have audit committee 
members that were certifi ed public accountant 
(CPA).  On the other hand, 25 percent of 77 
companies that were not in fi nancial problems 
had audit committee members who were 
CPAs.  Indeed, accounting or fi nancial experts 
among the audit committee members may help 
to improve the quality of fi nancial statement 
reporting.
An audit committee that has fi nancial or 
accounting experts is considered more qualifi ed 
in executing its monitoring role, which to some 
extant might increase the company’s value.  A 
study by Davidson, Xie, and Xu (2004) found 
that the information regarding the existence of 
fi nancial expertise within an audit committee 
caused the market to react positively as 
refl ected in the stock price. Their result 
showed that capital market tended to favor 
a company whose directors were considered 
competent in ensuring the good conduct of 
fi nancial reporting activities.  Thus, possessing 
relevant knowledge will cause audit committee 
members to competently examine and oversee 
the fi nancial reporting activities and this, in 
turn, might increase investors’ confi dence in 
the company.
Employing audit committee members 
with fi nancial expertise provides evidence 
that fi nancial statement manipulations can be 
prevented.  To some extent, combined with 
regular meetings, an audit committee that 
is more knowledgeable about accounting 
and fi nance is more likely to minimize the 
occurrence of earnings manipulation within 
a company (Saleh et al., 2007).  Additionally, 
90
Melinda. L Nelwan & Billy. I Tansuria, Audit committee characteristics and earnings management  practice
a study by Badolato et al. (2014) which was 
conducted on US fi rms in the period of 2001 
to 2008 found that audit committee fi nancial 
experts who hold higher status in the 
company is also effective to reduce earnings 
management practices.  Alkdai and Hanefah 
(2012) examined the relation of audit committee 
characteristics and earnings management of 
270 Malaysian companies that complied with 
the Shariah laws in the period of 2007 to 2009. 
They found no signifi cant relationship between 
audit committee fi nancial experts measured by 
the proportions of professional accountants 
and earnings management measured by 
discretionary accruals.  In contrast, a company 
with fewer fi nancial expert members in the 
audit committee tends to encounter fi nancial 
problems (Rahmat, Iskandar, & Salleh, 2009). 
Having more experts in the area of accounting 
and fi nance within an audit committee 
should promote effectiveness in controlling 
the fi nancial reporting process and hinder 
the managers’ propensity to manipulate 
earnings.  Thus, this study conjectured that 
the accounting and/or fi nancial expertise is 
effective to prevent earnings management 
practices in Indonesia.  Hence, the hypothesis 
would be;
H2: Audit committee expertise affects earnings 
management practices in Indonesian listed 
manufacturing companies.
3.  RESEARCH METHOD
Data and Sample  
The population of this study consists of 135 
listed manufacturing companies.  Based on 
the initial purposive sampling criteria this 
study found 133 manufacturing companies 
that are consistently listed on the IDX which 
formed 931 fi rm-year observations. After 
removing companies that reported their 
fi nancial statement not in Indonesian Rupiah, 
the fi scal year ended other than on December 
31, and the fi nancial and governance data are 
not available, the remaining samples are 648 
fi rm-year observations.  Further data analysis 
showed there were three observations that 
are considered as infl uential outliers, thus 
excluded from the sample.  The fi nal sample 
size consists of 645 fi rm-year observations (i.e., 
105 unique fi rms).  Table 1 presents the sample 
selection.
The fi nancial data of this study are taken 
from corporate fi nancial reports published 
in IDX website and/or company websites. 
Additionally, the corporate annual reports 
were used in obtaining data regarding audit 
committee independence and expertise, 
following by a content analysis.
Research Model
Several earnings management models are 
widely used in extant studies.  Two of the 
models are the Modifi ed Jones Model and the 
Performance-Adjusted Modifi ed Jones Model. 
Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) described 
the fi rst model in their study that compares 
several earnings management models. 
Dechow et al. (1995) stated that the original 
Jones Model was modifi ed “to eliminate the 
conjecture tendency of the Jones Model to 
measure discretionary accruals with an error 
when discretion is exercised over revenues” (p. 
199).  The modifi cation was done by adjusting 
the changes in revenues by the changes in 
receivables during the period of observation. 
Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) proposed a 
model that is called the Performance-Adjusted 
Modifi ed Jones Model.  Their model considers 
offering further control on fi rms’ performance, 
Table 1  
Sample Selection
Firm-year Observations
Criteria:
Consistently listed between 2009 to 2015 931
Less:
Financial Statements are not reported in IDR 77
Annual Reports ended on other than Dec 31 28
Incomplete Data 178
Sample 648
Less: Infl uential outliers 3
Final Sample 645
Source: Data Processed
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because they argued that “fi rms classifi ed 
as having abnormally high or low levels of 
earnings management are those that manage 
more than would be expected given their level 
of performance” (p. 165).  Hence, those two 
models were used in this study to provide 
comparison and ensure the robustness of the 
results.
The fi rst model used to obtain the earnings 
management for cross-sectional analysis in this 
paper is stated below:
TACCit /TAit-1 = 0 (1/TAit-1) + 1 (ΔREVit - 
ΔRECit/ TAit-1) + 2 (PPEit/TAit-1) + εit…......(1)
TACC is the total accruals which obtained 
from the differences between operating profi t 
after taxes and cash fl ows from operating 
activities.  The 1/TAit-1 is replaced the constant 
in the original Jones Model (Jones, 1991), 
ΔREV are the changes in revenues, ΔREC are 
the changes in accounts receivables and PPE 
is the gross amount of Property, Plant and 
Equipment, while the εit is the error term which 
is basically the estimated discretionary accruals 
that proxies for earnings management.  The 
ΔREV, ΔREC, PPE are scaled by lagged total 
assets, which like Kothari et al. (2005) state is 
intended to alleviate the heteroscedasticity 
which is the non-constant variance of the 
residuals that would possibly violate the OLS 
assumption.
The second earnings management model 
used in this study was developed by Kothari 
et al. (2005):
TACCit /TAit-1 = 0 (1/TAit-1) + 1 (ΔREVit 
-ΔRECit/TAit-1) + 2 (PPEit/TAit-1) + 3 ROAit-1 
+ εit.......................................................................(2)
The difference with the previous model 
is on the addition of return on assets (ROA) as 
part of the regression model.  ROA is the ratio 
of earnings to total assets.  By adjusting with 
ROA, they called this model Performance-
Adjusted Model.  The reason for them to adjust 
the traditional discretionary accruals model is 
to tackle the issue that accruals are related to 
the contemporaneous and past performance 
of the fi rms.  Following Chen, Elder, & Hsieh 
(2007), this study includes lagged ROA to the 
model.
Using both discretionary accruals (DACC) 
based on the Modifi ed Jones Model and the 
Performance-Adjusted Modifi ed Jones Model, 
the regression model is as follows:
DACCit = 0 + 1 AC_INDit + 2 AC_EXPit + 
3 SIZEit + 4 LEVit + 4 ROAit + εit ……....(3)
Where, DACC is the the residuals in 
Modifi ed-Jones Model and Performance-
Adjusted Modifi ed Jones Model which 
represents the earnings management.  AC_IND 
represents the audit committee independence, 
measured by the ratio of independent members 
to total audit committee members.  AC_EXP 
is the audit committee expertise, measured 
by the ratio of members whose background 
is accounting and/or fi nance to total audit 
committee members.  SIZE is the fi rm size 
measured by the natural logarithm of total 
assets.  LEV is the leverage, measured by the 
ratio of total liabilities to total assets.  ROA 
represents fi rm performance, measured by 
the ratio of earnings to total assets.  Firm size 
(SIZE), leverage (LEV) and fi rm’s performance 
(ROA) are several control variables that are 
generally used in earnings management studies 
(e.g., Saleh et al., 2007).  Therefore, following 
previous research, we included those control 
variables in the regression model.
4.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics of 648 observations 
are presented in Table 2.  On average, the 
total accruals of all fi rms are around 43 billion 
rupiahs.  The total assets are around 6.4 trillion 
rupiahs which on average the fi rms could be 
categorized as relatively large.  Approximately, 
revenues are 6.8 trillion rupiahs, receivables are 
652 billion rupiahs, and gross property, plant, 
and equipment are 3.6 trillion rupiahs.  ROA has 
a mean of approximately nine percent which 
shows that approximately the return is nine 
times the invested assets.  Leverage is around 
61 percent, meaning that on average total 
liabilities are 61 percent more than total assets. 
On average, 58 percent of audit committee 
members are classifi ed independent, and 67 
percent of the members have accounting and/
or fi nancial background.  This shows that 
generally fi rms comply with the regulations of 
audit committee independence and expertise 
as posed by BAPEPAM-LK and OJK.
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The descriptive statistics of discretionary 
accruals showed the unstandardized residuals 
of the two earnings management models 
which are the discretionary accruals of the 
Modifi ed Jones Model (DACC_MJ) and the 
discretionary accruals of the Performance-
Adjusted Modifi ed Jones Model (DACC_
PAMJ).  According to Lindelauf (2011), the 
unstandardized residuals are usually used 
to detect whether there are more negative or 
positive accruals and whether fi rms manage 
their earnings upwardly or downwardly.  On 
average, the unstandardized residuals from 
both models are positive, implies there are 
more upward-managed earnings.
Statistical Assumption Tests
Several regression assumption tests- 
homoscedasticity, autocorrelation, and multi-
collinearity-were conducted before performing 
the regression analysis.  Conducted by 
using Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test in 
STATA the results show that the variances 
were not constant, hence concluding there is 
heteroscedasticity problem. Nevertheless, the 
problem of heteroscedasticity was controlled 
by using robust standard error.  Conducted 
by using Breusch-Godfrey that there is 
autocorrelation problem in the regressions, 
which was able to be controlled by adjusting the 
standard error using cluster.  The collinearity 
problem was observed using VIFs or tolerances 
and the results show that, for each of the 
independent variable, the VIF value is less 
than 10 and the 1/VIF value is higher than 0.1. 
Therefore, there is no multicollinearity problem 
appears among the explanatory variables.
Regression Results
To test the hypotheses the fi rst regression 
analysis was conducted using the discretionary 
accruals obtained by the Modifi ed Jones Model 
(i.e., MJ).  Table 3 summarizes the comparison 
of results before and after including the control 
variables.  It shows that the adjusted R2 for this 
model is increased from only one percent to 
approximately 66 percent which means that 
the inclusion of the control variables is able to 
increase the explanatory power of the model. 
Overall, the models are signifi cant (p-value of 
the F-test is < 0.001).  Moreover, it is shown 
that the independence of audit committee 
is negative and signifi cant (p-value = 0.007). 
Therefore, H1 is supported, which means that 
audit committee independence affects the 
earnings management practices of a company. 
The predicted sign is consistent with previous 
studies that show as the audit committee 
becomes more independent the company will 
be less likely to practice earnings management 
(e.g., Alkdai & Hanefah, 2012; Kapoor & 
Goel, 2017; Nik Salleh & Che Haat, 2014). 
Therefore, it is evident that the independence 
characteristic determines the effectiveness of 
audit committee monitoring role in Indonesia. 
To maintain their reputation and to avoid 
losing their credibility, the independent 
members of the audit committee might exert 
their role in effectively monitor fi rms’ fi nancial 
reporting process. Moreover, being more 
independent enables the audit committee to 
carry out their tasks and duties respectably, 
especially in ensuring the effectiveness of the 
internal control over the fi nancial reporting 
process (García et al., 2012).  
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics
Variables  Mean  Std. Deviation Min Max N
TACC 42,947 1,332,477 -11,400,000 14,300,000 648
TA 6,379,640 21,200,000 901 245,000,000 648
REV 6,779,268 20,300,000 0.000 202,000,000 648
REC 652,424 2,424,385 0.000 46,300,000 648
GROSS PPE 3,619,360 9,459,194 654 103,000,000 648
ROA 0.092 0.633 -0.870 15.478 648
LEV 0.607 0.780 0.037 10.711 648
INDEP_AC 0.580 0.320 0.000 1.000 648
EXPERT_AC 0.667 0.259 0.250 1.000 648
DACC_MJ 0.049 0.932 -0.545 21.675 648
DACC_PAMJ 0.046 0.955 -0.308 21.594 648
Source: Data Processed
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The coeffi cient of audit committee 
expertise is not signifi cant at any confi dence 
level (p-value = 0.552).  Thus, H2 is rejected, 
which indicates that audit committee expertise 
does not affect earnings management.  The 
results for control variables are consistent 
with previous tests.  This shows that although 
on average the majority of audit committee 
members have accounting and fi nancial 
background this expertise may not be effective 
in preventing earnings management.  It can 
be argued that it is more important for audit 
committee members to be independent that 
to have particular expertise.  This is because 
the expertise may not guarantee the members 
to conduct true and fair control over the 
company’s fi nancial reporting process. 
Consequently, the discretion to manipulate 
fi nancial information should also be controlled 
through other monitoring mechanism within 
the fi rms.  According to Badolato et al. (2014) 
fi nancial expertise solely might not be an 
effective mechanism in preventing earnings 
management practices.  In fact, their study found 
that it is the join effect of both expertise and 
higher status of the audit committee members 
that makes their monitoring role more effective 
in lowering earnings management practices. 
Another study by Sharma and Kuang (2014) 
also found that when the fi nancial experts were 
also independent directors, they were able 
to lower earnings management propensity. 
Rationally, knowledge and expertise may not 
be enough to prevent irregularities in fi nancial 
reporting if it does not accompany by authority 
to exert certain decisive actions.   
Among the control variables, only LEV 
that is not signifi cant (p-value = 0.108).  The 
result also shows that fi rm size (i.e., SIZE) 
has a negative and signifi cant impact on 
discretionary accruals (p-value < 0.001).  The 
results support the fi ndings of previous studies 
(e.g., García, Barbadillo, & Pérez, 2012) This 
indicates that the larger the company, the 
lower the propensity to engage in earnings 
management practices.  The reason might be 
because larger fi rms are more likely to have 
better reputation and receive more scrutiny 
from the stakeholders, thus they tend to avoid 
damaging their reputation.  ROA is positive 
and signifi cant (p-value < 0.001) however the 
sign is not consistent with previous studies 
that predicted that company whose fi nancial 
performance is better will be less likely to 
manage its earnings (e.g., Kapoor & Goel, 
2017). 
Table 3
Regression Results using DACC from the Modifi ed Jones Model
VARIABLES MJ
Coeffi cient p-value Coeffi cient p-value
INDEP_AC -0.100*** 0.000 -0.042** 0.007
(0.028) (0.016)
EXPERT_AC -0.049 0.319 0.012 0.552
(0.050) (0.020)
SIZE -0.029*** 0.000
(0.006)
LEV 0.022 0.108
(0.014)
ROA 0.323*** 0.000
(0.023)
Constant 0.096 0.091 0.396*** 0.000
(0.057) (0.092)
Firm-year Obs. 645 645
R2 0.016 0.660
Adjusted R2 0.013 0.658
F-test 11.490 51.180
p-value  0.000 0.000
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Source: Data Processed
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Robustness Test
To ensure the robustness of the results, 
another regression analysis was conducted 
using discretionary accruals obtained by the 
Performance-Adjusted Modifi ed Jones Model 
(i.e., PAMJ).  Table 4 summarizes the results. 
Similar to the previous tests, the inclusion of 
control variables increased the adjusted R2 from 
one percent to around 78 percent showing that 
the inclusion of control variables improves the 
explanatory power of this model.  In addition, 
comparing the adjusted R2 of the Modifi ed 
Jones Model and that of the Performance-
Adjusted Modifi ed Jones Model showed that 
the latter model improves the explanatory 
power the earnings management model (i.e., 
from 66 percent to 78 percent).  The results also 
showed that audit committee independence 
has a negative and signifi cant infl uence on 
earnings management practices (p-value < 
0.001).  However, audit committee expertise 
does not seem to affect earnings management 
practices (p-value = 307).  Although a positive 
and signifi cant results is found for ROA, there 
is no impact of fi rm size and leverage on 
earnings management.  
Given that including ROA in the 
regression may be problematic since ROA has 
been included to measure the discretionary 
accruals, hence another regression analysis 
was performed without ROA in the control 
variables.  The result is consistent for the 
impact of audit committee independence on 
earnings management practices.  Nevertheless, 
the explanatory power of the last regression 
is substantially reduced (Adjusted R2 = 1.5 
percent), although it is still higher than without 
the inclusion of all control variables. 
5. CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, SUGGE-
STION, AND LIMITATIONS
The demand for more transparent and 
accountable fi nancial reporting is of particular 
interest of extant corporate governance and 
earnings management studies.  As one of 
the corporate governance mechanisms, the 
existence of an audit committee is deemed 
benefi cial to improve awareness to report 
true and fair performance of the companies. 
An audit committee is expected to assist in 
aligning management interests to that of the 
shareholders, especially to prevent fi rms 
engaging in earnings management practices.
Table 4
Regression Results using DACC from the Performance-Matched 
Modifi ed Jones Model
VARIABLES PAMJ
Coeffi cient p-value Coeffi cient p-value Coeffi cient p-value
INDEP_AC -0.080* 0.019 -0.064*** 0.000 -0.060** 0.002
(0.034) (0.017) (0.020)
EXPERT_AC -0.101 0.093 -0.020 0.307 -0.107 0.119
(0.060) (0.019) (0.068)
SIZE 0.003 0.425 -0.017 0.563
(0.004) (0.030)
LEV 0.016 0.218 -0.011 0.569
(0.013) (0.019)
ROA 0.433*** 0.000
(0.010)
Constant 0.113 0.100 -0.045 0.444 0.353 0.460
(0.068) (0.059) (0.476)
Firm-year Obs. 645 645 645
R2 0.013 0.781 0.021
Adjusted R2 0.010 0.779 0.0153
F-test 2.926 394.6 4.759
p-value 0.054 0.000 0.001  
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Source: Data Processed
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It is found in this study that audit 
committee independence negatively and 
signifi cantly affects earnings management 
practices.  The results implied that as an audit 
committee become more independent, it 
would be more likely to prevent a company 
from practicing earnings management.  Thus, 
it indicates that the regulation regarding 
audit committee independence is relatively 
effective to ensure the effectiveness of the 
audit committee monitoring role.  However, 
this study did not fi nd a signifi cant effect 
of the expertise of the audit committee on 
preventing earnings management.  Arguably, 
the accounting or fi nancial knowledge of audit 
committee members could not determine 
the effectiveness of the audit committee 
monitoring role in preventing a company to 
engage in earnings management.
This study implies that compliance with 
the regulation may not be a determinant 
in the effectiveness of audit committee 
role.  Companies that are only motivated by 
regulation compliance will be less concerned 
whether the existence of an audit committee 
within a fi rm is benefi cial or not.  They would 
only comply in a minimum level with the 
incentive of not being persecuted by the 
regulator or infl uential stakeholders.  On 
the contrary, companies that are concerned 
with whether the fi rm is well governed may 
take further steps to ensure they surpass the 
requirements of the regulation. This would 
relatively assure that these companies will 
perform better in their fi nancial reporting and 
be less engaged in manipulating earnings.  To 
some extent, the effectiveness of corporate 
governance mechanism within a fi rm may 
improve the transparency and accountability of 
a company which is then expected to contribute 
on the increasing investors’ confi dence in the 
company and capital market as a whole.
There are some limitations to this study. 
First, the external validity of this study might be 
considered low given that this study is confi ned 
only on manufacturing industry.  Second, this 
study might be less comprehensive in depicting 
the effectiveness of the audit committee 
characteristics because it only considers 
the two characteristics of audit committee: 
independence and expertise, although since 
2012 there are other characteristics that were 
specifi ed by the regulations concerning 
audit committee.  Lastly, this study unable 
to show the effectiveness of audit committee 
characteristics in preventing other earnings 
management practices, since it is only confi ned 
in analyzing earnings management through 
discretionary accruals.  
Given the limitations, there are several 
recommendations that can be made for further 
research related to this topic.  First, to increase 
the external validity, a similar study could 
be conducted across industries to examine 
whether audit committee characteristics 
provide different effects on different industries. 
Second, further study could also employ other 
characteristics of an audit committee besides 
independence and expertise, as specifi ed by the 
regulations (e.g., activity).  Third, another study 
could be conducted to compare the relation 
between audit committee characteristics and 
earnings management using other earnings 
management models or through considering 
the motivations behind earnings management 
practices.  Additionally, future research should 
also employ more control variables on the 
study.
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